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University, Chennai

**DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

**Course Code and Name : 19IT602– CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CYBER  
SECURITY**

**III YEAR / VI SEMESTER**

**Unit 3: ASYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY**

**Topic : Elliptic curve cryptography**



# Elliptic Curve Arithmetic

- Most of the products and standards that use public-key cryptography for encryption and digital signatures use RSA
  - The key length for secure RSA use has increased over recent years and this has put a heavier processing load on applications using RSA
- Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is showing up in standardization efforts including the IEEE P1363 Standard for Public-Key Cryptography
- Principal attraction of ECC is that it appears to offer equal security for a far smaller key size
- Confidence level in ECC is not yet as high as that in RSA

# Abelian Group

- A set of elements with a binary operation, denoted by  $\bullet$ , that associates to each ordered pair  $(a, b)$  of elements in  $G$  an element  $(a \bullet b)$  in  $G$ , such that the following axioms are obeyed:

**(A1) Closure:** If  $a$  and  $b$  belong to  $G$ , then  $a \bullet b$  is also in  $G$

**(A2) Associative:**  $a \bullet (b \bullet c) = (a \bullet b) \bullet c$  for all  $a, b, c$  in  $G$



**(A3) Identity element:**

There is an element  $e$  in  $G$  such that  $a \bullet e = e \bullet a = a$  for all  $a$  in  $G$

**(A4) Inverse element:**


For each  $a$  in  $G$  there is an element  $a'$  in  $G$  such that  $a \bullet a' = a' \bullet a = e$

**(A5) Commutative:**  $a \bullet b = b \bullet a$  for all  $a, b$  in  $G$



# Elliptic Curves Over $Z_p$

- Elliptic curve cryptography uses curves whose variables and coefficients are finite
- Two families of elliptic curves are used in cryptographic applications:



- Variables and coefficients all take on values in  $GF(2^m)$  and in calculations are performed over  $GF(2^m)$
- Best for hardware applications

- Use a cubic equation in which the variables and coefficients all take on values in the set of integers from 0 through  $p-1$  and in which calculations are performed modulo  $p$
- Best for software applications

# Points (other than $O$ ) on the Elliptic Curve $E_{23}(1, 1)$

(0, 1)	(6, 4)	(12, 19)
(0, 22)	(6, 19)	(13, 7)
(1, 7)	(7, 11)	(13, 16)
(1, 16)	(7, 12)	(17, 3)
(3, 10)	(9, 7)	(17, 20)
(3, 13)	(9, 16)	(18, 3)
(4, 0)	(11, 3)	(18, 20)
(5, 4)	(11, 20)	(19, 5)
(5, 19)	(12, 4)	(19, 18)




Figure 10.5 The Elliptic Curve  $E_{23}(1,1)$



# Elliptic Curves Over $GF(2^m)$

- Use a cubic equation in which the variables and coefficients all take on values in  $GF(2^m)$  for some number  $m$
- Calculations are performed using the rules of arithmetic in  $GF(2^m)$
- The form of cubic equation appropriate for cryptographic applications for elliptic curves is somewhat different for  $GF(2^m)$  than for  $Z_p$ 
  - It is understood that the variables  $x$  and  $y$  and the coefficients  $a$  and  $b$  are elements of  $GF(2^m)$  and that calculations are performed in  $GF(2^m)$






Figure 10.6 The Elliptic Curve  $E_{2^4}(g^4, 1)$

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

- Addition operation in ECC is the counterpart of modular multiplication in RSA
- Multiple addition is the counterpart of modular exponentiation

To form a cryptographic system using elliptic curves, we need to find a “hard problem” corresponding to factoring the product of two primes or taking the discrete logarithm

- $Q=kP$ , where  $Q, P$  belong to a prime curve
- Is “easy” to compute  $Q$  given  $k$  and  $P$
- But “hard” to find  $k$  given  $Q$ , and  $P$
- Known as the elliptic curve logarithm problem

### Global Public Elements

$E_q(a, b)$  elliptic curve with parameters  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $q$ , where  $q$  is a prime or an integer of the form  $2^m$

$G$  point on elliptic curve whose order is large value  $n$

### User A Key Generation

Select private  $n_A$   $n_A < n$

Calculate public  $P_A$   $P_A = n_A \times G$

### User B Key Generation

Select private  $n_B$   $n_B < n$

Calculate public  $P_B$   $P_B = n_B \times G$

### Calculation of Secret Key by User A

$$K = n_A \times P_B$$

### Calculation of Secret Key by User B

$$K = n_B \times P_A$$

# ECC Diffie-Hellman

- can do key exchange analogous to D-H
- users select a suitable curve  $E_p(a,b)$
- select base point  $G=(x_1,y_1)$  with large order  $n$  s.t.  $nG=O$
- A & B select private keys  $n_A < n, n_B < n$
- compute public keys:  $P_A = n_A \times G, P_B = n_B \times G$
- compute shared key:  $K = n_A \times P_B, K = n_B \times P_A$ 
  - same since  $K = n_A \times n_B \times G$

# ECC Encryption/Decryption

- several alternatives, will consider simplest
- must first encode any message  $M$  as a point on the elliptic curve  $P_m$
- select suitable curve & point  $G$  as in D-H
- each user chooses private key  $n_A < n$
- and computes public key  $P_A = n_A \times G$
- to encrypt  $P_m$  :  $C_m = \{kG, P_m + k P_b\}$ ,  $k$  random
- decrypt  $C_m$  compute:  
$$P_m + kP_b - n_B(kG) = P_m + k(n_B G) - n_B(kG) = P_m$$



# Security of Elliptic Curve Cryptography

- Depends on the difficulty of the elliptic curve logarithm problem
- Fastest known technique is “Pollard rho method”
- Compared to factoring, can use much smaller key sizes than with RSA
- For equivalent key lengths computations are roughly equivalent
- Hence, for similar security ECC offers significant computational advantages



# Comparable Key Sizes in Terms of Computational Effort for Cryptanalysis (NIST SP-800-57)

Symmetric key algorithms	Diffie-Hellman, Digital Signature Algorithm	RSA (size of $n$ in bits)	ECC (modulus size in bits)
80	$L = 1024$ $N = 160$	1024	160–223
112	$L = 2048$ $N = 224$	2048	224–255
128	$L = 3072$ $N = 256$	3072	256–383
192	$L = 7680$ $N = 384$	7680	384–511
256	$L = 15,360$ $N = 512$	15,360	512+

*Note:*  $L$  = size of public key,  $N$  = size of private key





# THANK YOU